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The Availability of Equitable Relief in Civil Causes of
Action in RICO
Since the enactment of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO")' in 1970, its opponents have made sig-
nificant attempts to restrict the statute's scope. 2 Accordingly, the op-
ponents of RICO have proposed a number of judicial limitations as
methods to narrow the impact of the statute.3 As a result of these
efforts, some courts have taken steps to preclude a private plaintiff
suing under RICO from receiving equitable relief under the statute.4
This Note examines the methods employed by courts to narrow
the remedial provisions of RICO to preclude equitable relief for pri-
vate plaintiffs. Part I discusses the impropriety of this judicial restric-
tion in light of the express language of RICO and its liberal
construction directive. Part II argues that even if RICO is read as
not expressly providing equitable relief for private plaintiffs, this
form of relief should nevertheless be implied by the courts under the
Supreme Court's principles of statutory construction. Part III ana-
lyzes those decisions in which federal courts have expressed a willing-
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
2 See, e.g., ABA: REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, SECTION ON CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE (1982), in which the American Bar Association adopted twelve proposed amendments
to RICO. One of these proposals includes the repeal of RICO's Liberal Construction Clause,
a proposal which, if enacted by the legislature, would cripple the statute's effectiveness. See
notes 23-26 infra. It is interesting to note that the ABA wholeheartedly supported the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act in 1970, and proposed only two amendments to Title IX, both of
which were adopted: RICO's treble damages provision, and an amendment giving courts
discretion to close certain proceedings. Organized Crime Control, Hearings on .30 and Related
Proposals before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on theJudiciag, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 538, 543-
44 (1970) (testimony of ABA President Edward L. Wright). See generally Blakey, RICO Civil
Fraud Action in Context: Refltctions on Bennet a. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 246 n.25 (1982).
3 For example, some courts have attempted to restrict the class of potential RICO de-
fendants to members of a so-called "organized crime" family. See Adair v. Hunt Int'l Re-
sources Corp., 526 F. Supp 736, 747 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (dismissal of RICO claim against land
developers because they were not "involved with 'organized crime' or activities within the
penumbra of that phrase"); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(denial of a motion to amend a complaint against a telephone answering service to include a
RICO claim because the defendant was not a member of "a society of criminals operating
outside the law"). These courts ignore the absence of any such requirement in the express
language of RICO. Moreover, analysis of RICO's legislative history clearly reveals that the
statute should not be restricted in this manner. See note 69 infra. See generaly Wexler, Civil
RICO Comes of Age; Some Malturational Problems and Proposals or Reforn, 35 RUTGERS L. REV.
327-34 (1983).
4 See text accompanying notes 112-75 infra.
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ness to restrict the availability of equitable relief under RICO and
illustrates the flaws in reasoning which enabled these courts to reach
this result.
I. Does RICO Expressly Provide Equitable Remedies for Private
Plaintiffs Suing Under the Statute?
A. The Text of RICO. Section 1964 Civil Remedies
In determining the scope of the remedies available to a private
plaintiff suing under a statute, the traditional approach 5 is to first
examine the text of the statute. Section 19626 provides that RICO is
violated by "any person. . . associated with any enterprise. . . the
activities of which affect . . . commerce, conduct[ing] . . . the enter-
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity."' 7 Section
1964(a)8 confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts to prevent
5 In the Supreme Court's own words, it "has stated repeatedly of late that in any case
concerning the interpretation of a statute the 'starting point' must be the language of the
statute itself." Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60 (1980) (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979)); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979); South-
eastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979). RICO, of course, is subject to
this basic rule. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1980) ("[w]e look first to
[RICO's] language").
6 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of
an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the
meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indi-
rectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in,
or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. ...
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enter-
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful
debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provi-
sions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
7 Id
8 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982) provides:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent
and restrain violations of Section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders,
including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest,
direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future
activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to prohibiting any
[1984]
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and restrain violations of Section 1962 through broad equitable re-
medial powers, including, but not limited to, the power to order
divestitures, reorganizations and dissolutions.9 Section 1964(a) does
not limit the use of these broad equitable remedial powers to govern-
ment or other types of suits.'0 Rather, the section simply provides
the broad discretionary power of the federal district courts to fashion
equitable relief in cases where violations of RICO are found."
Section 1964(b)12 grants power to the Attorney General to insti-
tute proceedings under section 1964(a).13 This express grant of power
to the government to sue was necessary to assure its right to bring
civil suits and seek equitable relief against RICO violators. 14 Absent
section 1964(b), the government's ability to seek this type of relief for
violations of RICO would have been subject to challenge.t 5 Accord-
ingly, this provision should be read as putting beyond question the
Attorney General's power to utilize RICO's civil equitable
remedies. 16
person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the
activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or





12 18 U.S.C. § 1964(h) (1982) provides:
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. In any
action brought by the United States under this section, the court shall proceed as
soon as practicable to the hearing and determination thereof. Pending final deter-
mination thereof, the court may at any time enter such restraining orders or
prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory per-
formance bonds, as it shall deem proper.
13 Id
14 See notes 15-16 inra.
15 By expressly providing that the government may seek equity relief under RICO,
§ 1964(b) sets aside the old rule that only a victim, and not the government, may enjoin a
crime. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 582-84 (1895).
16 The purpose of § 1964(b) was to put beyond question the right of the government to
bring a civil suit beyond the traditional limitations of equity jurisprudence. United States v.
Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358-59 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). The de-
fendants in Cappettlo challenged a district court's grant of a preliminary injunction to the
United States under civil RICO because the government had not shown the? traditional eq-
uity requirements of irreparable injury or inadequacy of remedy at law. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit responded:
"We need not decide the academic question of whether, in the absence of Sec-
tion 1964, such a showing would be necessary. It was plainly the intention of Con-
gress in adopting Section 1964 to provide for injunctive relief against violations of
Section 1962 without any requirement of a showing of irreparable injury other than
the injury to the public which Congress found to be inherent in the conduct made
unlawful by Section 1962. It is also obvious that Congress did not intend to require
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Section 1964(c)17 authorizes suits by private parties; it then pro-
vides for the recovery by a successful plaintiff of treble damages,
costs, and attorney's fees. 8 The language of this provision does not
expressly preclude the private plaintiff from receiving equitable re-
lief. Section 1964(c) states that the injured party shall "sue and," not
"sue to." 19 No warrant exists, therefore, to read Congress' decision to
grant treble damages to private plaintiffs as an incentive to enforce
RICO as a decision to deny them other forms of relief.20
If treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees had not been added
for private plaintiffs, victims suing under RICO would have been
restricted to receiving the usual range and types of relief, including
injunctions and actual damages. Under these circumstances, a vic-
tim contemplating the possibility of bringing a RICO civil action
would, in many cases, have found the litigation involved to be pro-
hibitively expensive, despite the ultimate value of the various forms
of relief to which he would have been entitled.21 Section 1964(c) was
a showing of inadequacy of remedy at law. If, as defendants contend, the existence
of a criminal remedy at law under Section 1963 would defeat an action in equity
under Section 1964, the latter section would be a nullity."
Id at 1358-59.
The necessary inclusion of § 1964(b) in RICO should not be interpreted to deny private
plaintiffs the right to seek equitable relief.
17 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) provides: "Any person injured in his business or property
by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost
of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
18 Id.
19 Id The difference in wording is crucial. "Sue to" expresses an intent to restrict the
remedies "to" those listed. "Sue and," however, expresses an intent to add to the remedies
already available. See note 162 infra. See Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Liebowitz, No.
83-7728, slip op. at 2510 ("[o]nce the Supreme Court handed down Bell. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
(1946). . . a specific statutory provision [in RICO] authorizing. . . injunctive relief. . . was
no longer necessary").
20 Unless a statute specifically defines a word used within it, a court should "start with
the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words
used." Russello v. United States, 104 S.Ct. 296, 299 (1983) (citing Richards v. United States,
369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)). The ordinary meaning of the word "and" is certainly not restrictive.
Rather, Webster's Dictionary defines the word "and" to mean: "along with or together
with;" "added to or linked to;" "in addition to." WEBSTERS THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 80 (3rd ed. 1971). It is difficult to see how a court applying the ordinary mean-
ing of the word "and" could view Congress' decision to add the right to secure treble damage
relief to the general right to sue as manifesting an intention to subtract the right to obtain
other forms of relief.
21 There is sound economic reasoning underlying Congress' decision to provide a treble
damages remedy for private RICO plaintiffs. Professor (now Judge) Richard A. Posner
makes a strong argument for encouraging private enforcement of more than actual damage
awards against deliberate anti-social conduct, particularly where the factor of concealment is
present. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 462 (private enforcement), 143, 272
[1984]
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designed to eliminate this obstacle to the private enforcement of
RICO by providing the possibility of adequate compensation to
those victims who choose to undertake this difficult task.22
B. Liberal Construction
RICO is a remedial statute containing both criminal and civil
provisions for its enforcement.2 3 The traditional canon of statutory
construction is that remedial statutes are to be construed liberally to
effect their purposes.2 4 Congress clearly intended RICO to be so con-
strued, since the statute itself contains a Liberal Construction
Clause.2 5 The drafters of RICO also provided a Congressional State-
ment of Findings and Purpose to aid in the statute's construction.2 6
(more than actual damages for deliberate conduct), 235 (concealment) (2d ed. 1977). Posner
recognized the importance of private enforcement of public law and its historical precedent in
the criminal and regulatory law of England. Id. at 462. The need for a careful blending of
public and private enforcement, therefore, is manifest.
22 Congress has described the purpose of the treble damages provision as providing the
possibility of adequate compensation for private plaintiffs suing under the statute. In report-
ing on S.1630, the criminal code bill, the Senate Judiciary Committee described RICO in
these terms:
"[I]t is hoped the knowledge that a person will be subject to substantial civil dam-
ages will serve as an effective deterrent to the commission of. . . [a RICO] offense.
[However,] [t]he purpose of the [treble damage civil recovery] . . . is remedial, not
penal; adequate relief or compensation is the main goal."
S. REP. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1273 (1981). Here, the Committee cited United States
v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 313-16 (1976), which articulated a theory of multiple compensa-
tion recovery under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-233, 235 (1976).
23 It was the clear intent of Congress that RICO be a remedial statute. Title IX, "it
[was] . . . emphasized, [is] remedial rather than penal." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist
Sess. 82 (1969). When Congress clearly classifies a remedy as not penal, courts will give this
classification great deference. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-51 (1980) (civil pen-
alty classified as such for all purposes, including federal common law that may have pointed
in the other direction); City ofMilwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 204, 312-15 (1981)
(statute controls over federal common law). Accordingly, RICO has been appropriately clas-
sified by the courts as remedial, not penal. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of
Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 681, 683-85 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (RICO remedial for survivorship and
statute of limitations in private treble damage action).
24 Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968). Seegenerall K. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theogy
of Appellate Decision and the Rules and Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REv. 395 (1950); K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION app. c (1960). See also
note 69 infra.
25 The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982)) ("The provisions of. . . [RICO] shall be liberally con-
strued to effectuate its remedial purposes."). For a comprehensive analysis of the background
and rationale of the liberal construction clause, see Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction
Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 167 (1980).
26 The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922-23
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982)) states:
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A substantial majority of federal courts has been willing to con-
strue liberally the provisions of RICO in the application of its crimi-
nal remedies.2 7 A minority has questioned the constitutionality of
such interpretation, based on the belief that due process requires
strict construction of penal statutes. 28 This minority is mistaken in its
Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose
"The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly
sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of
dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force,
fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power
through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan
sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of nar-
cotics and other dangerous drugs, and othe [sic] forms of social exploitation; (3) this
money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business
and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized
crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic
system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free
competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domes-
tic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and
(5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering
process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence
necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and reme-
dies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
"It is the purpose of this Act ... to seek the eradication of organized crime in
the United States by strenghening [sic] the legal tools in the evidence-gathering pro-
cess, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions
and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime."
RICO's Liberal Construction Clause is unique in federal law, except for the Criminal
Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1982). It is not unique in state law. A majority of states
today has abolished the common law rule of strict construction either by expressly abrogating
it or adopting some variation of "fair import" or "liberal construction." The statutes are
collected in Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237, 245 n.25 (1982). On the relation between the liberal construction
clause and the rule of lenity, see id. at 288-90 n.150. The abolition was part of a legislative
response to judicial hostility to reform movements in the 19th century. Indeedjudicial hostil-
ity to change through legislation was so common at that time "that it became standard prac-
tice in drafting statutes to insert a preamble stating broadly the purpose of the act and to
close with a provision declaring that the statute should be liberally construed." D. WIGDOR,
RoscoE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW 174 (1974).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993, 997-98 (7th Cir. 1981) (the office of
Governor of the State of Tennessee held to be an "enterprise" within the meaning of RICO;
the court found the language of RICO to be "both clear and broad, particularly because
Congress provided the Liberal Construction Clause"); United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880
(5th Cir. 1978) (definition of "enterprise" extended to include diversified wholly illicit associa-
tion in fact), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978).
28 See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1369-70 (8th Cir. 1980) (court
doubted the propriety of the Liberal Construction Clause, and chose instead to apply the rule
of lenity, giving a narrow interpretation to "enterprise"); United States v. Grzwacz, 603 F.2d
682, 692 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980) (Swygert, J., dissenting) ("unclear
[1984]
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belief: due process does not require the strict construction of penal
statutes.29 Thus, even if RICO were to be classified as penal rather
than remedial in nature, ,liberal construction would still be proper.30
Section 1964, however, is part of the civil, and not the criminal,
provisions of RICO. 3' Not even a colorable claim exists that liberal
construction of the civil provisions of RICO in accordance with the
Liberal Construction Clause would be unconstitutional. 32 It might
be argued that a liberal construction of a particular provision is not
an appropriate way to handle the problem that RICO was designed
to address. That, however, is not a proper decision for a court to
make.33 Congress carefully considered both the form and substance
of RICO.3 4 Amendments of the statute, if any, should come only
whether Congress intended its directive to apply to those sections which establish criminal
liability or merely to the 'remedial' provisions of Title IX").
29 See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1981) (inappropriate to strictly
construe a penal statute under the rule of lenity where statutory ambiguity does not exist:
"Lenity thus serves only as an aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget
one'); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1957) (Narcotic Drugs Import and Export
Act should not be strictly construed because Congress clearly did not intend it to be); United
States v. Brown 333 U.S. 18, 25 (1947) ("The canon in favor of strict construction is not an
inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose.').
30 See note 29 supra.
31 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982).
32 See text accompanying notes 24-26 sup ra.
33 See notes 34-35 infra and accompanying text.
34 On December 18, 1969, Senator McClellan, for the Judiciary Committee, reported out
S. 30, the Organized Crime Control Act, amended to incorporate S. 1861 as Title IX. S. REP.
No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 83 (1969). On reporting the bill, Senator McClellan observed:
"[This debate on the Organized Crime Control Act] is the culmination of a year of detailed
study, hearings, and consultations, and a result of one of the most thoroughly gratifying bi-
partisan efforts in which I have participated since coming to the Senate." 116 CONG. REC.
585 (1970). The Senator then listed the groups whose opinions had been consulted and whose
ideas and suggestions had been embodied in the bill, including.
IT1he President's Crime Commission, The National Commission on Reform of Fed-
eral Criminal Laws, The American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards
of Criminal Justice, The Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute, The
Model Sentencing Act [of the] . ..National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
The Association of Federal Investigators, The New York County Lawyers Associa-
tion, The American Civil Liberties Union, . . The National Association of Coun-
ties and The New York State Bar Association . . . . The National Chamber of
Commerce and the International Association of Chiefs of Police.
116 CONG. REC. 585. The Supreme Court termed the Act, in lannelli v. United States, 420
U.S. 770, 789 (1975), a "carefully crafted piece of legislation."
Congressman Poff, another sponsor of the Act, responded to the critics of the bill, who
suggested it was ill-drafted or not well thought-out, when he observed:
[In his] experience, no single measure [had] received more thorough consideration
by a legislative committee than this bill. On numerous occasions, it required
lengthy discussions in order to arrive at a consensus or compromise. . . . Prece-
dents as contained in numerous court decisions were reviewed and weighed - and
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through the legislative process. Even ignoring the separation of pow-
ers questions involved, 35 the lower courts should realize the propriety
of construing liberally the provisions of RICO because of the
Supreme Court's recent acknowledgements of the importance of the
Liberal Construction Clause. In United States v. Turkette36 and Russello
v. United States,37 the only RICO cases which have been decided by
the Supreme Court to date, the Court has acknowledged the exist-
every effort was made to produce a strong and effective tool with which to combat
organized crime - and at the same time deal fairly with all who might be affected
by this legislation - whether part of the crime syndicate or not.
116 CONG. REC. 35,204 (emphasis added). Accordingly, no court ought now re-weigh the
"balance" between "opposing policy arguments," Mobile Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436
U.S. 618, 623 (1978), strike a new "compromise," Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826
(1980), or make an effort to rewrite this carefully crafted piece of legislation, Iannelli v.
United States, 420 U.S. 770, 789 (1975). Congress has "annouce[d its] . . . considered judg-
ment." City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (quoting Mobile Oil Corp. v. Higgin-
botham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)). That ought to end the matter, absent constitutional
considerations, which are not implicated. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981)
("[t]here is no argument that Congress acted beyond its power. . . . That being the case, the
courts are without authority to restrict the application of the statute.").
35 Justice Harlan's classic statement concerning the separation of powers is a clear articu-
lation of the deference which a court should grant the intent of Congress:
[Tihe question relates to matters of public policy. . . and Congress alone can deal
with the subject; . . . [a] court would encroach upon the authority of Congress if,
under the guise of construction, it should assume to determine a matter of public
policy[.] . . . [T]he [opponents of a statute] must go to Congress and obtain an
amendment of the . . . [statute] if they think . . . [it wrong.] . . . [The Supreme
Court] cannot and will notjudcialy legislate, since its function is to declare the law,
while it belongs to the legislative department to make the law.
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 102 (1910) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
36 452 U.S. 576, 587-89 (1981). Turkette was the first case involving RICO decided by the
Supreme Court. The essence of the defendant's argument was that, because his association
performed only illegal acts, and did not involve legitimate business, it was not an "enterprise"
for the purposes of RICO. The Court held that "enterprise" as used in RICO encompasses
both legitimate and illegitimate associations. The Supreme Court acknowledged RICO's
Liberal Construction Clause and Statement of Findings and Purpose in its decision, stating
that "[i]n view of the purposes and goals of the Act, as well as the language of the statute, we
are unpersuaded that Congress nevertheless confined the reach of the law to only narrow
aspects of organized crime." Id at 579.
37 104 S. Ct. 296 (1983). The defendant in Russello was convicted under RICO for his
involvement in an arson ring that resulted in his fraudulently receiving insurance proceeds in
payment for the fire loss of a building he owned. The defendant appealed the judgment of
forfeiture which was entered against him for the amount of the insurance proceeds, arguing
that the proceeds did not constitute a forfeitable "interest" within the meaning of
§ 1963(a)(1). The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the provisions of RICO should
be narrowly interpreted, once again emphasizing that the Liberal Construction Clause and
Statement of Findings and Purpose, far from revealing a limited congressional intent, instead
"clearly [demonstrate] that the RICO statute was intended to provide new weapons of un-
precedented scope for an assault upon organized crime and its economic roots." Id. at 302.
[19841
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ence of the Liberal Construction Clause and Congressional State-
ment of Findings and Purpose. The Court expressed no
disinclination to follow the manifest intent of Congress.38
A fair construction of section 1964(c) leads to the conclusion
that a successful private plaintiff suing under RICO should receive
not only treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees, but also any equi-
table relief that he might be entitled to under section 1964(a). Given
the Liberal Construction Clause, the question of how this interpreta-
tion follows from the text is largely a matter of indifference. If the
text is plain, the remedy is there; if the text is ambiguous, the ambi-
guity should be resolved in favor of enhancing the remedial purpose
of RICO.
Regarding the availability of equitable remedies for private
plaintiffs, then, two interpretations of the text are possible: they are
available or they are not. In choosing between these two alterna-
tives, the Liberal Construction Clause mandates that a court follow
the interpretation that effects the remedial purposes of the statute.39
Granting full equitable remedies to private plaintiffs suing under
RICO effects the remedial purposes of the statute. In Russello, the
Supreme Court noted that "the RICO statute was intended to pro-
vide new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon organ-
ized crime and its economic roots. ' 4° The Court also pointed out
that "Congress emphasized the need to fashion new remedies in or-
der to achieve its far-reaching objectives."' 41 Indeed, in some situa-
tions, the possiblity of receiving equitable relief might be the sole or
primary factor motivating a victim in bringing a RICO civil ac-
tion.42 If victims of RICO violations are not given this form of relief,
the public will have to rely upon the government to seek equitable
enforcement of RICO, thus frustrating Congress' intent that RICO
also be enforced through the private action.43 In light of the Con-
38 In Russdlo, the Court stated: "This Court has recognized the significance of this state-
ment of findings and purpose. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 588-589. . . . Further,
Congress directed. .. 'The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purpose.'" 104 S. Ct. at 302.
39 See note 25 supra.
40 104 S.Ct. 296, 302 (1983).
41 Id at 302.
42 See note 21 supra.
43 An analogy to the jurisprudence of private civil suits under § 4 of the Clayton Act is
particularly helpful to demonstrate the inconsistency of discouraging private civil suits under
RICO. This analogy is persuasive authority since § 1964 was modeled on antitrust law. S.
REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 81 (1969); H. R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56-
60 (1970). To the degree that RICO was drafted outside the antitrust provisions, it was to
avoid restrictive antitrust precedent. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540
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gressional mandate in the Liberal Construction Clause, a federal
court should not feel that it does not have the authority to grant full
equitable relief to private plaintiffs in appropriate circumstances.44
II. The Supreme Court Jurisprudence as Applied to RICO:
Principles of Statutory Construction
Despite the Liberal Construction Clause and the Congressional
Statement of Findings and Purpose, lower federal courts have at-
tempted to restrict the remedies available to private plaintiffs suing
under RICO.45 These courts give skant attention to the question of
whether section 1964, read by itself or in conjunction with the Lib-
eral Construction Clause, expressly provides equitable remedies for
private plaintiffs. Instead, they have argued that it is necessary to
employ the Supreme Court's principles of statutory construction to
determine if these equitable remedies may nevertheless be implied in
the statute.46 The express language of the statute should render such
an analysis unnecessary. Nevertheless, an examination of RICO, fol-
lowing the teachings of the Supreme Court on the implication of
claims for relief in federal statutes, shows that it would be proper to
imply equitable remedies for private plaintiffs.
A. The Legal Environment in Which RICO Was Enacted
Proper analysis of RICO under the Supreme Court's rules of
statutory construction requires application of the law as it existed at
the time of RICO's passage in 1970.47 The lower court decisions
have wrongly suggested, however, that RICO should be analyzed
under the stricter rules of statutory construction established by the
F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1982) ("section 1964(c) was ... cast as a separate statute inten-
tionally to avoid the restricted precedent of antitrust jurisprudence") (emphasis added).
Therefore, what the Supreme Court has said of private civil suits under § 4 may be legiti-
mately observed of RICO. Congress "created the treble-damage remedy ... precisely for the
purpose of encouraging private challenges to violations." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.
330, 334 (1979) (emphasis in original). Private suits in fact "provide a significant supplement
to the limited resources available to the Department of Justice." Id. In fact, between 1960
and 1980, of the 22,585 civil and criminal cases brought under the antitrust provisions by the
government or private parties, 84% were instituted by private plaintiffs. U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE SOURCE BOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 431 (1981). It would be in-
consistent with Congress' use of an antitrust model in drafting RICO to not encourage pri-
vate plaintiffs to bring civil actions under the statute.
44 See notes 112-15 infra.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 See notes 49-56 infra and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court's 1975 decision in Cort v. Ash.48 Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Penner & Smith v. Curran49 demonstrates the impropriety of this
approach.
In Curran, the Supreme Court stated that "[i]n determining
whether a private cause of action is implicit in a federal statutory
scheme when the statute by its terms is silent on the issue, the initial
focus must be on the state of the law at the time the legislation was
enacted. ' 50 Congress is assumed to have been familiar with the cur-
rent status of the law when it passed the legislation in question. 5'
Accordingly, judicial perception of the law must bear heavily on the
intent of the Congress in passing the statute in the form in which it
did. "[O]ur focus must be on the intent of Congress when it enacted
the statute in question. ' 52 The law as it exists today would be rele-
vant only if one is willing to assume that Congress can predict the
future. If RICO is read as being silent on the issue of private equita-
ble remedies, the statute should, therefore, be interpreted using the
rules of statutory construction that existed when it was passed in
1970, and not the stricter rules established in 1975 in Cort v. Ash. 53
The Court in Curran provided a clear statement of the law as it
existed in 1970:
If a statute was enacted for the benefit of a special class, the
judiciary normally recognized a remedy for members of that
class. Texas &PacifieR. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). Under
this approach, federal courts, following a common law tradition,
regarded the denial of a remedy as the exception rather than the
rule.5
4
Under the approach which prevailed until Cort, "congressional
silence or ambiguity was an insufficient reason for the denial of a
remedy for a member of the class a statute was enacted to protect. '55
It was considered the duty of the courts to provide any remedies nec-
essary to effect the congressional purpose.5 6
Congress obviated the necessity of inferring the precise purposes
of RICO by including a Congressional Statement of Findings and
48 422 U.S. 66 (1974).
49 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
50 Id. at 378.
51 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-97 (1979) ("It is always appropri-
ate to assume that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law.").
52 Daily Income Fund Inc. v. Fox, 104 S. Ct. 831, 839 (1984).
53 Id.
54 456 U.S. at 374-75.
55 Id. at 377.
56 J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
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Purpose in the statute itself.57 The last paragraph of the Statement
declares that: "It is the purpose of the Act. . . [to provide] enhanced
sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of
those engaged in organized crime."581 The Supreme Court has explic-
itly recognized the significance of this Statement. 59 In United States v.
Turkette, 60 the Court noted that "the very purpose of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970 was to enable the Federal Government to
address a large and seemingly neglected problem. The view was that
existing law, state and federal, was not adequate to address the prob-
lem, which was of national dimensions." 6' Similarly, the Court
stressed, in Russello v. United States ,62 that "Congress emphasized the
need to fashion new remedies in order to achieve its far reaching
objectives."' 63 Analyzing RICO under the rules of statutory construc-
tion that existed in 1970, the question then becomes whether the im-
plication of equitable remedies for private plaintiffs would make
effective these express purposes of Congress.
The private suits authorized by section 1964(c) of RICO are
part of a statute that expressly states as its purpose the provision of
new remedies to combat organized crime.64 Such private suits should
certainly be encouraged, and it cannot seriously be argued that equi-
table remedies would not play an integral role in the private enforce-
ment of the Act.65  As a practical matter, federal and state
governments simply do not have adequate resources to investigate,
much less prosecute, every RICO violation. 66 The availability of eq-
57 The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922-23
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982)); see note 26 supra.
58 Id.
59 See text accompanying notes 60-63 infa.
60 See discussion at note 36 supra.
61 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586.
62 104 S. Ct. 296 (1983).
63 Id. at 302.
64 The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922-23
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982)); see text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
65 See note 43 supra.
66 The inadequacy of these resources was demonstrated by a study conducted by the
Section on Criminal Justice of the American Bar Association into the resources devoted to
investigation and prosecution of fraud. This study was conducted under a federal grant, and
the final report is reprinted in White Collar Crime I978. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of
the House Comm. on theJudiciag, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 260-82 (1978). The Section studied the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States
Postal Inspection Service, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Internal
Revenue Service, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, various banking agen-
cies, and selected state and local efforts. Its findings were deeply disturbing. The Section
found that the "[tiotal federal effort against economic crime [was]. . . in need of the develop-
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uitable relief to RICO private plaintiffs, then, would provide greater
incentive for victims to bring these suits. Innovative use of equitable
remedies by the courts in private RICO actions could provide a
means of dealing with RICO offenders that simply cannot be accom-
plished by the imposition of treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees
upon a guilty defendant.67 The congressional sponsors of RICO ex-
pressed the desirability of such innovative use of the statute.68
RICO is a broad remedial statute. Although its primary pur-
pose is to provide effective remedies to be used against organized
crime, its prohibitions necessarily encompass other conduct not nor-
mally considered within the realm of organized crime per se.69 An
underlying concern of the courts that have expressed a willingness to
ment of priorities." Id. at 264. In addition, "available resources [were] . . . unequal to the
task of combatting organized crime." Id. The "lack of resources at the federal and local level
[was]. . . a function of insufficient manpower and inadequately trained personnel." Id. at
265. The implications of this study for federal government enforcement of RICO are obvious.
The resources which would be necessary for adequate government investigation and prosecu-
tion of RICO violations simply do not exist.
67 RICO grants broad equitable powers. Se 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982) ("prevent and
restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders"). In light of
its liberal construction clause and its legislative history, § 1964 ought to be held to authorize
temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, receiverships, and the full range of ulti-
mate equity relief on the request of the government or private parties. Se, e.g., 115 CONG.
REC. 9567 (1969) (statement of Sen. McClellan, one of the sponsors of RICO) (RICO is not
"limit[ed to] the remedies. . . already. . . established. The ability of our chancery courts to
formulate a remedy to fit the wrong is one of the great benefits of our system of justice.").
68 115 CONG. REc. 6993 (1969) (statement of Sen. Hruska) ("The bill is innovative
... . Hopefully experts on organized crime will be able to conceive of additional applica-
tions of the law. The potential is great.")
69 It is necessary that RICO's scope extend beyond "organized crime" to allow the stat-
ute to accomplish this primary purpose. During the House hearings on RICO, Senator Mc-
Clellan, one of RICO's sponsors, observed in response to objections that RICO was
unnecessarily broad:
[T]he objection confuses the role of the Congress with the role of a court. Out of a
proper sense of their limited lawmaking function, courts ought to confine their judg-
ments to the facts of the cases before them. But the Congress in fulfilling its proper
legislative role must examine not only individual instances, but whole problems. In
that connection, it has a duty not to engage in piecemeal legislation. Whatever the
limited occasion for the identification of a problem, the Congress has the duty of
enacting a principled solution to the entire problem. Comprehensive solutions to
identified problems must be translated into well integrated legislative programs.
116 CONG. REc. 18,913-14 (1970). Senator McClellan later observed:
Members of La Cosa Nostra and smaller organized crime groups are suffi-
ciently resourceful and enterprising that one constantly is surprised by the variety of
offenses that they commit. It is impossible to draw an effective statute which
reaches most of the commercial activities of organized crime, yet does not include
offenses commonly committed by persons outside organized crime as well.
Id. at 18,940. See also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 561 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("This
view is beset by many difficulties. It assumes that Congress could and should specify in ad-
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deny equitable relief to RICO private plaintiffs seems to have been
that these plaintiffs often are not seeking relief from "organized
crime" activity.70 Accordingly, the equitable remedies were not nec-
essary to effect the statute's primary purpose to provide remedies for
organized crime activity.7 1 This analysis, however, fails to consider
that if RICO private plaintiffs are statutorily denied the right to seek
equitable relief in cases which do not involve organized crime, they
will also be denied this right in the cases which do involve organized
crime. Not only would the implication of the right of RICO private
plaintiffs to seek equitable relief effect the clear congressional pur-
poses of RICO, but the denial of that right would seriously impede
those same purposes.
Treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees simply may not pro-
vide the necessary incentive to the victim who has a meritorious com-
plaint. This may be especially true in cases actually involving
organized crime, cases which would have the greatest social value
and which should be encouraged. 72 A victim, for example, may have
vance all the possible circumstances to which a remedial statute might apply and state which
cases are within the scope of a statute.").
70 See, e.g., Dan River v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983).
71 Id.
72 It is unnecessary to go any further than the legislative history of RICO for an example
of this precise type of situation. In the House of Representatives, S. 30, the Organized Crime
Control Act, was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary on January 26, 1970. 116
CONG. REC. 1103 (1970). On March 10, 1970, Congressman Poff took the floor to comment
on it, and in particular on Title IX (RICO). Congressman Poff was "a manager of the bill."
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 (1981). As such, his comments are entitled to
weight. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 63 (1980). Congressman Poff brought to the
attention of the floor a "thoughtful and accurate" analysis of S. 30 prepared by the United
States Chamber of Commerce, which included "several specific hypothetical examples, which
aid[ed] the reader in understanding concretely the provisions of S. 30." 116 CONG. REC.
6708 (1970). The Chamber of Commerce report included a detailed analysis of how the
Senate bill would operate to attack a Mafia boss' takeover of a jukebox corporation. The
report commented:
A Mafia boss accepts all the shares in ajuke box corporation in payment for an
illegal gambling debt. Then he expands the number of cafes in which his machines
are placed by having the cafe owners threatened and beaten. Soon, he dominates
the music machine business in his city, has ruined his competitors, and raises the
share of the machine income which he demands that the cafes pay him. Under
present law, the government may be able to obtain a criminal conviction, imprison-
ment and fine.
The trouble is that while the Mafia boss serves his prison term, other members
of the syndicate run the business for him, and upon his release he resumes his brutal
and monopolistic methods. . . . Thus, in the illustration used above, a criminal
prosecution (under Title IX as passed in the Senate) of the Mafia boss could also
result in forfeiture to the government of his interest in the business, or a civil pro-
ceeding that could result in an order that he divest himself of the business and
refrain from re-entering that line directly or indirectly. In either case, the court
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suffered considerable loss at the hands of a member of the Mafia
during the course of the member's infiltration of the victim's legiti-
mate business. While the plaintiff may have suffered great economic
loss, the possibility of recovering treble damages, costs, and attorney's
fees may in fact not be enough to encourage the victim to bring suit.
A RICO violation is difficult to establish, 73 and the victim certainly
has no guarantee of prevailing on the merits. Moreover, the defend-
ant may have rendered himself judgment-proof by the time that
judgment actually is obtained. 74 In addition, if equitable remedies
are not available to private plaintiffs, the perpetrator may be free to
carry on his illicit activities and continue to injure the plaintiff and
others, despite the treble damages award.75 If he cannot seek equita-
ble relief, a victim faced with these possibilities, as well as the real
possibility of physical or economic retaliation by a vengeful defend-
ant, may well foresee that he could end up worse off than he was
before instituting the law suit.
Section 1964(c) cannot fulfill its statutory purpose of providing
an effective remedy for the proscribed conduct of RICO without the
implication of equitable relief for private plaintiffs in all types of
RICO cases. The rules of statutory construction under which RICO
should be analyzed, therefore, dictate that these equitable remedies
should be implied.
could supervise the sale of the business to see that it wound up in clean hands. A
legitimate industry could be returned to lawful operation in a free enterprise system.
116 CONG. REc. 6709-10 (1970).
73 See notes 97-100 injfa and accompanying text.
74 In 1963, for example, the McClellan Committee investigated the organized crime op-
erations of Santo Trafficante, the Tampa, Florida Mafia boss. Neil G. Brown, the Tampa
Chief of Police, testified: "We know of no legitimate businesses that are owned or controlled
by Santo Trafficante. He owns no real estate, nor any other property, real or personal. His
house, automobile and all his other possessions are held in the name of others." Organized
Crime and Illicit Traftc in Narcotics: Hearings Before the Subcomm on Investigations of the Senate
Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 527-28 (1963) (statement of Neil G.
Brown). See airo Forfeiture of Narcotics Proceeds: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice,
Comm. on theJudiciay, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 96-97, 114 (1980) (statement of Irvin B. Nathan)
(three problems: 1) ascertaining what the assets are, 2) reaching them if they are in the hands
of third parties, and 3) preventing their dissipation before trial; problems compounded since
"sophisticated criminals ...have access to the best lawyers and accountants money can
buy"); STRONGER FEDERAL EFFORT NEEDED IN FIGHT AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME: RE-
PORT BY COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 31-34 (1981) (problems in crimi-
nal forfeiture: 1) uncertain status ofassets, 2) third party holdings, and 3) dissipation prior to
seizure); ASSET FORFEITURE-A SELDOM USED TOOL IN COMBATTING DRUG TRAFFICKING,
REPORT OF COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 30-42 (1981) (same).
75 "'[I]f the offender is judgment proof, as is so often the case with criminal offenders, the
[civil] remedy is ineffectual." POSNER, supra note 21, at 467.
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B. The Consequences of Denying Equitable Relief to Private Plainti#
Suing Under RICO
If RICO private plaintiffs are denied the right to seek equitable
relief in addition to treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees, similar
relief may be available to them under other federal and state laws.76
Equitable relief obtained under laws other than RICO, however,
would be subject to limitations that would not apply to the same
type of relief obtained under RICO.77
Careful examination of the consequences of limiting the equita-
ble relief available to RICO private plaintiffs in this manner is neces-
sary to complete a proper analysis of RICO under the rules of
statutory construction that existed in 1970. Such examination
clearly shows that equitable remedies for private plaintiffs must be
implied in RICO to prevent a result that would be contrary to the
intent of Congress in passing the statute.
If RICO is interpreted as providing equitable relief to private
plaintiffs, a person suing under the statute would receive preliminary
and final equitable relief pursuant to section 1964. Section 1964 au-
thorizes the district courts to issue any appropriate orders necessary
to prevent and restrain violations of RICO.78 The result of allowing
private plaintiffs to seek preliminary and final relief under RICO,
rather than under other federal and state law, is significant. The
general rule for obtaining equitable relief under federal statutes that
authorize equitable remedies is that the traditional required factors
of inadequacy at law or irreparable injury need not be shown to re-
ceive the requested relief.79 This would provide the RICO private
plaintiff with a valuable tool, because he would need only show a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits to receive equitable re-
lief.80 Furthermore, it would be immaterial that a private party, and
not the government, was seeking the relief.8 ' This result would effect
76 See text accompanying notes 83-85 infra.
77 See text accompanying notes 86-111 infira.
78 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
79 Neither FED. R. Civ. P. 64 nor traditional equity jurisprudence controls in the face of
a specific federal statute. The text of Rule 64 is explicitly subject to any existing statute of the
United States. FED. R. Civ. P. 64; United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358-59 (7th
Cir. 1974) ("It was plainly the intention of Congress in adopting Section 1964 to provide for
injunctive relief without any showing of irreparable injury. . . or inadequacy of remedy at
law."), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
80 502 F.2d at 1359.
81 See, e.g., Atchison, T & S. F. Ry. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255, 259 (10th Cir. 1981) (rail-
roads able to obtain injunctive relief without showing of irreparable harm or inadequacy of
remedy at law because relief was sought pursuant to a federal statute).
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one of the primary purposes of RICO by providing "enhanced sanc-
tions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in organized crime."' 2
If, however, RICO is interpreted as neither expressly nor implic-
itly providing equitable relief to private plaintiffs, a person suing
under the statute would be entitled to seek preliminary equitable re-
lief under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 3 Any
preliminary relief sought by a plaintiff which appeared to be more
legal than equitable in nature (attachment, for example) would have
to be obtained under Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.84 RICO private plaintiffs seeking final equitable relief would
be relegated to any remedies which they might obtain through state
82 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589 (1981).
83 FED R. Civ. P. 65(b) provides:
(b) Temporary Restraining Order; Notice; Hearing; Duration. A temporary re-
straining order may be granted without written or oral notice to the adverse party
or his attorney only if (1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or
by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage
will result to the applicant before the adverse party or his attorney can be heard in
opposition, and (2) the applicant's attorney certifies to the court in writing the ef-
forts, if any, which have been made to give the notice and the reasons supporting his
claim that notice should not be required. Every temporary restraining order
granted without notice shall be indorsed with the date and hour of issuance; shall be
filed forthwith in the clerk's office and entered of record; shall define the injury and
state why it is irreparable and why the order was granted without notice; and shall
expire by its terms within such time after entry, not to exceed 10 days, as the court
fixes, unless within the time so fixed the order, for good cause shown, is extended for
a like period or unless the party against whom the order is directed consents that it
may be extended for a longer period.
An additional argument can be made that the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982), may
be invoked to preserve the status quo in appropriate circumstances. See FTC v. Dean Foods,
384 U.S. 597, 603-05 (1966) (preliminary injunction to prevent merger); ITT Community
Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 457 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Fla. 1978) (injunction issued to protect damage
claim).
84 FED. R. Civ. P. 64 provides:
SEIZURE OF PERSON OR PROPERTY
At the commencement of and during the course of an action, all remedies pro-
viding for seizure of person or property for the purpose of securing satisfaction of the
judgment ultimately to be entered in the action are available under the circum-
stances and in the manner provided by the law of the state in which the district
court is held, existing at the time the remedy is sought, subject to the following
qualifications: (1) any existing statute of the United States governs to the extent to
which it is applicable; (2) the action in which any of the foregoing remedies is used
shall be commenced and prosecuted or, if removed from a state court, shall be prose-
cuted after removal, pursuant to these rules. The remedies thus available include
arrest, attachment, garnishment, replevin, sequestration, and other corresponding or
equivalent remedies, however designated and regardless of whether by state proce-
dure the remedy is ancillary to an action or must be obtained by an independent
action.
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causes of action under a theory of pendent jurisdiction.8 5
1. Preliminary Relief Under Rules 64 and 65
A RICO private plaintiff would find it much more difficult to
obtain preliminary equitable relief under Rule 65 than he would if
the relief could be obtained under RICO. A plaintiff seeking such
relief under Rule 65 to prevent further damages pendente lite would
be required to satisfy the four traditional factors: irreparable harm,
balance of inconvenience, probability of success, and the public in-
terest. 6 If the preliminary relief sought by the plaintiff was consid-
ered by the court to be legal in nature, rather than equitable, the
plaintiff would be entitled to the relief "available under the circum-
stances and in the manner provided by the law of the state in which
the district court is held, existing at the time the remedy is sought. '87
The problems that would arise if private plaintiffs are denied
the right to this preliminary relief under RICO are well illustrated
by Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Gleave.88 The plaintiffs in Ashland attempted to
secure a preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from dis-
posing of or transferring their tangible assets without prior court ap-
proval.8 9 The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the
preliminary equitable relief requested was available under section
1964(a).90 Indeed, the court rejected the argument that the relief re-
quested was equitable at all.91 The court decided that the plaintiff
had actually requested attachment, a legal remedy which, pursuant
to Rule 64, was governed by New York state law.92 Since the court
85 See text accompanying notes 99-111 infra.
86 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948 (1973).
See Doran v. Salem Inn. Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931-32 (1975); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 45
(1975); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 84 n.53 (1974); Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S.
813 (1929). The traditional factors have been reformulated as probability of success and
irreparable injury or serious question and balance of hardships. See, e.g., John B. Hull, Inc. v.
Waterbury Petroleum Prod., Inc., 588 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960
(1979). Generally, the factors are formulated and applied in the traditional fashion. See, e.g.,
Hannis Corp. v. National Iranian Radio and Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1353-58 (1 1th Cir.
1982); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1980).
87 FED. R. CIv. P. 64; see note 84 supra.
88 540 F. Supp. 81 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
89 Id. at 82.
90 Id. at 85.
91 Id. at 86. The court believed that the plaintiffs request for a provisional remedy had
to be strictly construed because it was in derogation of the common law. Id. at 83. But see
Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REv. 383, 387-88, 406-07 (1908) ("proposi-
tion. . . has no justification. . .[T]he public cannot be relied upon. . . to tolerate judicial
obstruction ...of social policies.").
92 540 F. Supp. at 83; see note 84 supra.
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believed that it was required to apply state law, it did so. The court
concluded that the plaintiff could not satisfy the requirements of
New York state law necessary to grant such an attachment, even
though the court found that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a
probability of success on the merits. 93 The Ashland court doubted
whether the frustration of a money judgment could ever constitute
the irreparable harm necessary to receive preliminary relief.94
The Ashland decision reveals a serious problem that will arise if
RICO private plaintiffs are denied the right to seek preliminary equi-
table relief under the statute. If private plaintiffs are forced to satisfy
either state law requirements or the traditional factors of Rule 65 to
obtain preliminary relief, they may find themselves unable to prevent
their potential treble damages awards from being disposed of by de-
fendants prior to issuance of a judgment.95 This would be particu-
larly true in jurisdictions such as that of the Ashland court, where
doubt exists as to whether a preliminary injunction should ever be
issued to secure a money judgment.96 This result would severely
hamper the effectiveness of RICO's private treble damages remedy.
2. Final Equitable Relief Through State Claims Under )Pendent
Jurisdiction
Section 1962 makes unlawful certain activity in violation of
RICO.9 7 To violate any one of the four provisions of section 1962, a
person must engage in a pattern of racketeering activity.98 Section
1961(1) defines racketeering activity through a long list of federal
and state crimes.99 Section 1961(5) defines a pattern of racketeering
93 540 F. Supp. at 82.
94 Id. at 86.
95 See notes 74-75 supra.
96 See Ashland, 540 F. Supp. at 86. ("It is questionable whether. . . frustration of en-
forcement of a money judgment . . . can ever constitute irreparable harm.")
97 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982). See note 6 supra.
98 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982). See note 6 supra.
99 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982). Some of the crimes which constitute racketeering activity
include: murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in nar-
cotic or other dangerous drugs, which crimes are chargeable under state law and punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year; sports bribery, counterfeiting, theft from interstate
shipment, embezzlement from pension and welfare funds, extortionate credit transactions,
transmission of gambling information, mail fraud, wire fraud, obstruction ofjustice, obstruc-
tion of criminal investigations, obstruction of State or local law enforcement, racketeering,
interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia, unlawful welfare fund payments, illegal
gambling businesses, interstate transportation of stolen property, trafficking in contraband
cigarettes, and white slave traffic, which crimes are chargeable under federal law.
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activity to require at least two acts of racketeering activity. 100
Because of the nature of the predicate offenses that must be
proven to satisfy RICO's pattern of racketeering requirement, most
RICO actions naturally give rise to parallel state claims.' 0 ' A federal
court may assume pendent jurisdiction of these state claims. The
state claims should easily satisfy the requirement of UnitedMine Work-
ers v. Gibbs'0 2 that, in relation to the federal claim, they are "deriv[ed]
from a common nucleus of operative fact" such that a plaintiff
"would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial pro-
ceeding."10 3 A federal court maintaining pendent jurisdiction over
the parallel state claims could conceivably provide complete equita-
ble relief to a RICO private plaintiff. Although this may appear to
accomplish the same objectives as would equitable remedies under
RICO, it would not. Many problems will arise if private plaintiffs
suing under RICO have to rely on pendent jurisdiction of their state
claims to receive equitable relief.
Pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, and not a plain-
tiff's right. 0 4 A district court may consider many factors in deciding
whether to maintain pendent jurisdiction over a state claim, includ-
ing judicial economy, convenience, fairness to the litigants, and jury
confusion.10 5 Nothing exists to prevent a court that has denied equi-
table relief to a private plaintiff under RICO from invoking its dis-
cretionary powers to also deny pendent jurisdiction of the plaintiff's
state claims.106
Moreover, a federal court that is willing to exercise its discre-
tionary powers of pendent jurisdiction and to grant equitable reme-
dies to a private RICO plaintiff will still find itself limited in many
instances. The court will have to apply state law to the pendent state
claims, and the types of equitable relief available vary from state to
state. 107 A federal court might well find that it does not have the
100 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
101 See note 99 supra. In United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), the Supreme
Court stated "the States remain free to exercise their police powers to the fullest constitu-
tional extent in defining and prosecuting crimes in their respective jurisdictions . .. [even
though] some of those crimes may also constitute predicate acts of racketeering under RICO."
Id. at 586 n.9.
102 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
103 Id. at 725.
104 Id. at 726.
105 Id. at 726-29.
106 Id.
107 The problems which could be caused by the differences in the laws of the various states
regarding equitable relief are best illustrated by the facts of United States v. Marubeni
America Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980). In Marubeni, Marubeni America Corporation
[1984]
[Vol. 59:945]
authority to grant the most appropriate relief a situation may call
for, simply because the state law that it must apply does not make
that particular equitable remedy available. 0 8 A federal court grant-
ing private equitable relief under RICO, on the other hand, would
have at its disposal a full range of equitable remedies with which to
and Hitachi Cable Ltd., as well as a corporate officer of each company, were charged under
§ 1962(c) for operating the affairs of an enterprise "through" a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity, which consisted of mail fraud, wire fraud, and interstate bribery. The indictment alleged
that Marubeni's local representative paid bribes to Richard McBride, an employee of
Anchorage Telephone Utility, an instrumentality of the Municipality of Anchorage, Alaska,
to obtain confidential bidding information that was used to secure $8.8 million in telephone
cable contracts. See United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982) (conviction of
representative upheld). In addition, the government sought forfeiture under § 1963(a)(1) of
"any and all sums or amounts paid or payable" to either corporation as a result of contracts
procured through the § 1962(c) violation. In Marubeni, although the court of appeals held
that the proceeds of a contract tainted by bribery were not subject to forfeiture under
§ 1963(a)(1), the court noted that civil remedies, namely treble damages and equitable relief,
were available. 611 F.2d at 770 n. 13. How general federal jurisprudence of a legal or equita-
ble character would apply, moreover, is not in serious doubt. Breaches of the principal-agent
relationship give rise to a legal claim for relief. See Jankowitz v. United States, 533 F.2d 538
(Ct. Cl. 1976) (counterclaim to recover bribes); United States v. Drumm, 329 F.2d 109 (1st
Cir. 1964) (recovery of monies paid to poultry inspector); United States v. Bowen, 290 F.2d
40, 44 (5th Cir. 1961) ("The master as the party whose trust has been betrayed. . . is entitled
to all of the fruits of the servant's dereliction."). Here, those damages - the amount of the
bribes - would be trebled, to a total of $990,000. In addition, the relief would not be limited
to damages. A constructive trust could be imposed and the proceeds duly traced and restitu-
tion ordered. United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286 (1910) (constructive trust imposed on
illegal profits garnered by an army captain from contracts let). Contracts vitiated by fraud
may also be rescinded without a quantum meruit accounting. K & R Eng'g Co. v. United
States, 616 F.2d 469, 476-77 (Ct. Cl. 1980). Here, that would mean $8.8 million returned to
the company without an accounting for the cable received. The no quantum meruit accounting
rule in government contracts tainted by fraud stems from principles well-established since the
time of the Tea Pot Dome scandals. See Mammoth Oil Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 13
(1922) (cancellation of oil lease); Pan American Petroleum and Transp. Co. v. United States,
273 U.S. 456 (1927). Accordingly, RICO should be read to authorize the Anchorage Tele-
phone Utility, an instrumentality of the Municipality of Anchorage, to seek such a full range
of legal and equitable relief.
If RICO were read to authorize only legal relief, recovery could be had for the bribes,
duly trebled, but substantial issues might rise concerning the scope of equitable relief under
pendent jurisdiction. For example, some states follow the no quantum meruit accounting rule.
See, e.g., St. Grand Inc. v. City of New York, 32 N.Y.2d 300, 344 N.Y.S.2d 938, 298 N.E.2d
105 (1973). But no Alaska precedent exists squarely on the question. A federal court should,
therefore, be reluctant under general principles of comity to decide how the Alaska Supreme
Court might decide the question. Imposing constructive trusts is also common in state juris-
prudence. See, e.g., Boston v. Santosuosso, 298 Mass. 175, 10 N.E.2d 271 (1937) (constructive
trust imposed on Mayor Curley); Jersey City v. Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 115 N.E.2d (1955) (con-
structive trust imposed on Mayor Hague). But what if Alaska law had not had an occasion to
deal with the political corruption so characteristic of the northeast? One cannot predict how
a federal court would or ought to resolve such important questions involving state law
jurisprudence.
108 See note 107 supra.
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grant the most appropriate relief in any given situation. 10 9
A plaintiff in need of individualized equitable relief will natu-
rally seek to bring the action in a state where the equitable remedies
are available. Thus, forcing RICO private plaintiffs to rely on possi-
ble pendent jurisdiction of their state claims to receive equitable re-
lief for RICO offenses will also promote forum shopping.'10 RICO is
particularly susceptible to forum shopping since, under its expansive
provisions for jurisdiction, venue, and process, most plaintiffs will
have the choice of bringing their action in one of several jurisdic-
tions."' In the interest of maintaining the integrity of the federal
court system, forum shopping is not a practice that should be
encouraged.
Examination of the consequences of denying RICO private
plaintiffs the right to seek equitable relief reveals a scenario replete
with pitfalls that Congress could not have intended when it passed
the statute. It is only possible to achieve the purposes for which Con-
gress enacted RICO by providing these equitable remedies under
RICO itself, and not forcing RICO private plaintiffs to rely on other
federal or state laws.
III. The Statement of the Lower Courts
RICO should be read as expressly providing, on the face of the
statute, equitable relief for private plaintiffs. If a court is not satis-
fied with this construction, proper application of the Supreme
Court's rules of statutory construction clearly shows that the equita-
ble remedies should nevertheless be implied for private plaintiffs.
Certain lower courts, however, have attempted to restrict the reme-
dies available to private plaintiffs suing under RICO, excluding eq-
uitable relief.
In Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn,1l2 Bennet v. Berg,"13 Trane Co. v. O'Connor
109 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982). See note 8 supra.
110 See Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Inftuenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Con-
cepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1039-40 (1980).
111 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (1982) provides:
(a) Any civil action or proceeding under this chapter against any person may
be instituted in the district court of the United States for any district in which such
person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.
(b) In any action under section 1964 of this chapter in any district court of the
United States in which it is shown that the ends of justice require that other parties
residing in any other district be brought before the court, the court may cause such
parties to be summoned, and process for that purpose may be served in any judicial
district of the United States by the marshal therof.
112 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983). Dan River involved the attempted takeover of Dan River,
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Securities,t 14 and Kaushal v. State Bank of India ,115 the private plaintiffs
Inc., a major textile manufacturer, by Carl C. Icahn and several companies under his control
("Icahn").
Dan River's RICO claim was based on allegations that some of the funds used by Icahn
in the attempted takeover were acquired through extortionate acts committed through Bay-
swater Realty & Capital Corporation, a company controlled by Icahn. Dan River alleged
several predicate offenses on which to base Icahn's violation of RICO. According to the
Fourth Circuit's opinion, the facts alleged by Dan River failed to demonstrate a strong likeli-
hood of success on the merits. Although this finding was sufficient reason to reject the RICO
claim as grounds for the injunction, the court nevertheless felt it necessary to express its "sub-
stantial doubt whether RICO grants private parties such as Dan River a cause of action for
equitable relief." Id. at 290. The court did not analyze this issue, but merely cited Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), and Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), as supportive of its proposition that "[ifn light of the
most recent indications from the Supreme Court, Dan River's action for equitable relief
under RICO might well fail to state a claim." Id. See text accompanying notes 49-111 supra.
113 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1983). The plaintiffs in Bennet were present and former resi-
dents of the John Knox Village retirement community in Lee's Summit, Missouri. The list
of defendants included the not-for-profit corporation John Knox Village, Kenneth Berg, the
founder of the Village, and various not-for-profit corporations allegedly controlled by Berg.
The plaintiffs alleged that the "defendants had conspired to, and did in fact, defraud
them with the result that plaintiffs face[d] the loss of the 'life care' which they expected to
receive in return for an initial endowment fee plus a monthly service fee." Id. at 1363. Count
I charged defendants with participating, and conspiring to participate, in a pattern of racke-
teering through mail fraud, in violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982). Count II was a
prayer for equitable relief in the form of reorganization of the village. 685 F.2d at 1065. The
district court had dismissed the plaintiff's complaint because "it failed to allege the existence
of an identifiable enterprise within the meaning of RICO, and because the equitable relief
sought by [plaintiffs was] not available to a private [party under RICO]." Id. at 1056. Be-
cause the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of Count II on other grounds, it declined to
"reach the difficult question whether. . . this equitable relief [was] available to private plain-
tiffs pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964 and, if not, whether such relief may be granted under the
court's general equitable powers." Id. at 1064. The court added, without "endorsing or re-
jecting the opinions there expressed," that such scholarship as the court had discovered had
concluded that "equitable relief [was] available to the private plaintiff." Id at 1064. The
court of appeals cited Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO):
Basic Concepts - Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L. Q. 1014, 1038 nn. 132-33. See airo id
at 1047 n.197.
On rehearing en banc, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of Count II, without
reaching the issue of equitable relief for private plaintiffs under RICO. Bennet v. Berg, 710
F.2d 1361 (1983). Judge McMillian, however, concurring in part and dissenting in part, did
not agree that Count II should be dismissed, and therefore "would also [have] reach[ed] the
question whether equitable relief is available to private parties under RICO. . . and [have]
answer[ed] that question affirmatively." 710 F.2d 1361 (1983) (McMillian, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
114 561 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) Plaintiff Trane sought a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the defendants from making any further purchases of Trane stock, from voting
their stock, and from disposing of it except under court order.
O'Connor was engaged in "risk arbitrage," a business which involves the purchase and
sale of the securities of companies involved in extraordinary transactions, such as reorganiza-
tions, liquidations, mergers, and tender offers. O'Connor had targeted Trane as a likely can-
didate for takeover and subsequently began purchasing large amounts of Trane stock, hoping
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requested equitable relief under the civil provisions of RICO. The
Dan River, Bennet, and Trane courts found it unnecessary even to
reach the issue.' 16 These courts did, however, raise questions as to
the availability of such relief but did not attempt to engage in any
analysis of the issue." 7 The Kaushal court found that the defendant
had violated RICO,"18 but denied the equitable relief requested by
the victims, stating that RICO does not make equitable remedies
available to private plaintiffs.) 9 To justify this result, the Kaushal
to profit either if Trane became involved in a merger or tender offer by a third party, or by
selling the shares back to Trane. Trane alleged that through these purchases O'Connor
manipulated the securities market in violation of sections 9(a)(2) and 10(b) of the Securites
Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a)(2), 78j(b) (1982). Trane also alleged that this same be-
havior also violated RICO.
The court first addressed the market manipulation claim, and found the proof to be
insufficient to support a finding that O'Connor had violated the Securities Exchange Act.
Next, the court addressed the RICO claim, stating that "[t]he threshold question for consider-
ation is whether a private party may maintain an action for injunctive relief under RICO."
561 F. Supp. 306. The court relied primarily on Dan River as casting serious doubt on "the
propriety of granting injunctive relief to private plaintiffs alleging violations under RICO."
Id at 307. The court then expressed its own "serious doubt that Trane may properly invoke
RICO to secure injunctive relief against O'Connor. However, [this court] need not reach that
issue. Since the activities of O'Connor have been held not to violate Section 9(a) or 10(b) of
the Exchange Act, these activities surely do not come within the ambit of RICO's proscrip-
tions. Accordingly, the claims under RICO must be dismissed." Id.
Trane recently appealed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction against
the defendants. Although the appellate court found it unnecessary to decide whether equity
relief is available to private plaintiffs suing under RICO, it did agree with the district court
that, at the very least, a showing of a likelihood of irreparable harm must be made before a
preliminary injunction will be granted to a private party suing under RICO. Trane Co. v.
O'Connor Secur., 718 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1983).
115 556 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1983). Kaushal involved a scheme devised by officers of the
State Bank of India ("SBI") to fraudulently induce the plaintiffs into purchasing the assets
and assuming the liabilities of a group of affiliated corporations which owed more than two
million dollars to SBI. This was accomplished by presenting the plaintiffs with false financial
statements, intentionally overstating the assets and understating the liabilities of these compa-
nies by more than $700,000. Once plaintiffs had purchased the companies and discovered the
fraud, the defendants planned to complete the scheme by foreclosing on the one solvent busi-
ness in the group, the Khyber India Restaurant, and selling it to one of SBI's important New
York customers. The plaintiffs sought treble damages in the first count of their complaint,
under § 1964(c). Count II of the plaintiff's complaint was a prayer for equitable relief in
which they sought to block SBI's sale of the Khyber India Restaurant and to divest SBI of
any interest which it had acquired in the restaurant. The district court ruled that although
the plaintiff's complaint was sufficient to establish a private cause of action for damages
under RICO, they were not entitled to the equitable relief requested because RICO does not
authorize, expressly or implicitly, equitable relief for private plaintiffs. See text accompany-
ing notes 121-125 infta.
116 See notes 112-14supra.
117 Id.
118 556 F. Supp. at 579-81.
119 Id. at 581-84.
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court engaged in a cursory analysis of the issue.1 20 Taken together,
the opinions of these courts have left in doubt the question of
whether courts will provide equitable relief to private plaintiffs under
RICO.
A. Kaushal v. State Bank of India
Since the court in Kaushal v. State Bank of India 121 was the only
lower court to actually find it necessary to decide whether RICO
private plaintiffs can receive equitable relief, it was the only court
that actually engaged in any substantial legal analysis of the question
beyond the bald statement that RICO does or may not provide such
relief. The Kaushal court, however, gave skant attention to the ques-
tion of whether section 1964, read by itself or in conjunction with the
Liberal Construction Clause, expressly provided equitable remedies
for private plaintiffs.122 Instead, it passed over this basic question
and stated that because equitable remedies were not expressly pro-
vided for plaintiffs under RICO, it was necessary to employ the ap-
plicable Supreme Court guidelines of statutory construction to
determine if these equitable remedies would nevertheless be im-
plied.1 23 The Kaushal court then relied on the stricter rules of statu-
tory construction established by the Cori v. Ash 124 line of cases to
support its decision not to imply equitable remedies for private
RICO plaintiffs. The court did not analyze RICO in light of the
more liberal rules existing in 1970, the year RICO was enacted.1 25
Nevertheless, a careful analysis of RICO under the rules established
by Cort v. Ash demonstrates that the Kaushal court was not justified in
denying equitable remedies to RICO private plaintiffs.
B. Cort v. Ash and Its Progeny
In Cort v. Ash, the Supreme Court formulated four factors that
must be considered in determining whether a private cause of action
or remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing for it. 126
These factors are:
120 Id. See text accompanying notes 121-75 infia.
121 556 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. I1. 1983).
122 The Kaushal court found it appropriate to "analyze" this important question in three
short paragraphs. 556 F. Supp. at 582.
123 Id. at 583.
124 442 U.S. 66 (1974).
125 556 F. Supp. at 584.
126 422 U.S. at 78.
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1. Is the plaintiff one of the class for whose special benefit
the statute was enacted?
2. Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or im-
plicit, to create or deny such a remedy?
3. Is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legisla-
tive scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?
4. Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state
law in an area basically the concern of the states, so that it would
be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law? 127
To determine whether equitable remedies should be implied for
RICO private plaintiffs under the test of Cori v. Ash, it is appropriate
to analyze the Supreme Court's application of each of the Cori factors
to the subsequent cases that have required their application. The
Kaushal court, however, undertook an incomplete analysis of the Cori
line of cases to support its decision. Of the several cases that have
followed and explained the Cort rules of statutory construction, the
Kaushal court chose to rely only on Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington 128
and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n 129 The court felt that those cases stated the rule that a court
may read additional judicial remedies into a statute only where
"strong indicia of a contrary legislative intent" negate the implica-
tion that "Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered ap-
propriate." 30 The court neglected to consider relevant legislative
history and those Supreme Court decisions that strongly indicate
that if RICO does not expressly provide equitable remedies for pri-
vate plaintiffs, the availability of the remedies nevertheless should be
implied.13  The Kaushal court also neglected to discuss or acknowl-
edge other cases in the Cort line which support the proposition. 32
Further analysis of Touche Ross and Sea Clammers, as well as the other
cases, reveals that the Kaushal court was not justified in refusing to
grant equitable relief to private plaintiffs suing under RICO.
1. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington
In Touche Ross, 33 the customers of Weis Securities, a brokerage
127 Id.
128 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
129 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
130 556 F. Supp. at 584.
131 See text accompanying notes 133-75 infia.
132 These cases are discussed in the text accompanying notes 142-60 infra. See also note
141 infra.
133 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
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firm, sued Touche Ross and Co. Touche Ross was the accounting
firm responsible for auditing the financial reports that Weis filed
with federal regulatory authorities pursuant to section 17(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.134 The customer's cause of action
was based on misstatements contained in the reports. 135 Although
section 17(a) imposed reporting requirements, it did not provide an
express cause of action for persons injured by violation of the stat-
ute. 136 The Supreme Court held that a private cause of action
should not be implied in section 17(a). The Court's decision not to
imply a cause of action turned on its application of the Cori factors to
section 17(a). 137
The Supreme Court first found that section 17(a) merely im-
posed record keeping and reporting duties on broker-dealers, without
prohibiting certain conduct or creating federal rights in favor of pri-
vate parties; the plaintiff customers, then, were not members of a
class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted. 3 8 Thus, sec-
tion 17(a) failed to satisfy the first factor of the Cori test.
There is no question that private plaintiffs suing under RICO
satisfy the first factor of the Cori test, since RICO victims are mem-
bers of the class for whom RICO was enacted. Unlike section 17(a),
section 1964 does not require a court to imply jurisdiction, a cause of
action, and a remedy. 139 Section 1964(c) expressly grants jurisdiction
and provides for a cause of action for "any person injured."'1 40 Only
the particular type of remedy needs to be implied. 14'
134 Id. at 563.
135 Id. at 565-66.
136 Id. at 569 (section 17(a) simply requires broker-dealers and others to keep records and
file reports as the commission may describe, but does not create a private cause of action in
favor of anyone).
137 Id. at 571 (no basis in the language of§ 17(a) for inferring that a civil cause of action
for damages exists for anyone).
138 Id. at 579.
139 18 U.S.c. § 1964(c) (1982). Se note 17 supra.
140 18 U.S.c. § 1964(c) (1982). See note 17 supra.
141 This distinction is important in questions of statutory construction. In section 1964(c),
Congress has expressly mandated that private plaintiffs have a cause of action under RICO.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(1) (1982). A court must be more cautious in implying a cause of action in a
statute which does not expressly provide for it, because the possibility that its decision may
over-extend the intent of the legislature is great. This danger is not nearly as great with
RICO and similarly constructed statutes, however, where the Congress has expressly stated
who may sue and the only remaining question is the scope of the remedies available under the
statute.
The Kaushal court suggested that the circumstances in Herman & Maclean v. Huddle-
ston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983), indicated that the Supreme Court would not be willing to imply
private equitable remedies in RICO. 556 F. Supp. at 584. The Kau.rhal court relied upon the
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A court's primary focus, however, should be on the second factor
of the Cort test: whether there is any indication of legislative intent,
explicit or implicit, to create or deny such a remedy. In Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran,142 the Supreme Court stated that
their cases subsequent to Cori v. Ash have plainly stated that the focus
must be on the intent of Congress. 143
The Supreme Court in Touche Ross did focus on the the legisla-
tive history of section 17(a), noting that it was was entirely silent on
the question whether a private right of action should be available
under the statute.144 This congressional silence reinforced the Court's
decision not to imply a cause of action, because to imply a private
cause of action based on congressional silence would be a "hazardous
enterprise, at best."' 145
The legislative history of RICO, unlike that of section 17(a), is
not silent on the issue of equity relief for private plaintiffs. 146 When
RICO came before Congress as Title IX of S.30, the Organized
Crime Control Act, Congressman Sam Steiger of Arizona proposed a
detailed amendment to the statute that would have provided express
equitable remedies for private plaintiffs suing under RICO.1 47 The
amendment proposed several other additions to the statute, includ-
ing the right of the Attorney General to sue for damages, the right of
the Attorney General to intervene in any civil suit which he deemed
to be of general public importance, and a five year statute of limita-
Supreme Court's finding of a specific congressional intent to cumulate remedies under federal
securities laws in making this statement. 556 F. Supp. at 584. The Kaushal court's suggestion
echoed a statement made earlier in the Kaushal opinion that "the inclusion of a single statu-
tory reference to private plaintiffs, and the identification of a single remedy for such plaintiffs
in that very section, logically carries the negative implication no other remedy was intended
to be conferred." 556 F. Supp. at 582 n.20. The Supreme Court in Huddleston, however,
actually stated that a court should be receptive to the implication of remedies in a statute
where failure to provide them would undermine the remedial purpose of the statute.
We also reject application of the maxim of statutory constructon, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius [, the expression of one thing is to the exclusion of all others.]. . . As
we stated in SEC v. Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51, 64 S. Ct. 120, 123, 88 L. Ed.
88 (1943), such canons "long have been subordinated to the doctrine that courts will
construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose."
...We believe the maxim cannot properly be applied where the remedies redress
different misconduct and where the remedial purposes of the Acts would be under-
mined by a presumption of exclusivity.
103 S. Ct. at 690 n.23.
142 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
143 Id. at 377.
144 442 U.S. at 571.
145 Id.
146 See text accompanying notes 147-51 infra.
147 116 CONG. REC. 35,227-28 (1970).
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tions.148 A day later, Congressman Richard H. Poff, a manager of
the bill, requested Congressman Steiger to withdraw his amend-
ment. 14 9 Poff expressed the need for the Judiciary Committee to ex-
plore the potential consequences of this amendment at a later
date.150 Congressman Steiger withdrew his amendment from consid-
eration, but, in doing so, expressed his belief that, without his amend-
ment, private plaintiffs still may have this option to seek equitable
relief.15 1
The legislative history of RICO is, moreover, strikingly similar
to the legislative history of Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 ("Title IX"). 1 52 In Cannon v. University of Chicago,'53 a major
Supreme Court case of the Cori line that was decided in the same
term as Touche Ross, the Court was asked to decide whether Title IX
provided an implied private cause of action. 5 4 In Cannon, the Court
focused on the intent of Congress as evidenced by the statute's legis-
lative history and found it proper to imply the private cause of ac-
tion. 155 The Court stated:
The only excerpt relied upon by respondents that deals pre-
cisely with the question whether the victim of discrimination has
a private remedy under Title VI was a comment by Senator
Keating. In it, he expressed disappointment at the administra-
tion's failure to include his suggestion for an express remedy in its
final proposed bill. Our analysis of the legislative history con-
vinces us, however, that neither the administration's decision not
to incorporate that suggestion expressly in its bill, nor Senator
Keating's response to that decision, is indicative of a rejection of
a private right of action against recipients of federal funds. In-
stead the former seems to have been a compromise aimed at pro-
tecting the individual rights without subjecting the Government
to suits, while the latter is merely one Senator's isolated expres-
sion of a preference for an express private remedy. In short,
neither is inconsistent with the implication of such a remedy.
Nor is there any other indication in the legislative history that
any Member of Congress voted in favor of the statute in reliance
on an understanding that Title VI did not include a private
remedy. 15 6
148 Id.
149 Id. at 35,346; United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 (1980).
150 116 CONG. REc. at 35,347.
151 Id. at 35,346-47.
152 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1972).
153 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
154 Id. at 688-89.
155 Id. at 717.
156 Id. at 713-16. Although the Court in Cannon was concerned with the legislative history
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The Court also found it important to note that Senator Keating
expressed his belief that, despite Congress' decision not to provide for
an express private remedy in Title IX, the private remedy was never-
theless implicit in the statute.' 57
Despite the obvious similarity of the legislative histories of Title
IX and RICO, the Kaushal court failed to use Cannon in its analysis.
Based on the Supreme Court's decision in Cannon, the Kaushal court
was not justified in relying upon Touche Ross to deny equitable reme-
dies to private RICO plaintiffs. RICO itself clearly expresses that it
was enacted for the special benefit of these private plaintiffs. 158 The
legislative history, if not supportive of an intent to imply equitable
remedies for private plaintiffs, certainly does not indicate a congres-
sional intent to deny these remedies. In Touche Ross, the Supreme
Court found it unnecessary to decide whether section 17(a) satisfied
the third and fourth factors of the Cori test, since the statute did not
satisfy the first two factors.5 9 The analysis followed by the Supreme
Court in its interpretation of section 17(a) in the Touche Ross case
was, therefore, in fact inconsistent with the analysis demanded by
RICO.
2. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n
The Kaushal court also relied upon another decision in the Cort
line, Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n. 160 The reliance on Sea Clammers is even less justified than the
reliance on Touche Ross.
The plaintiffs in Sea Clammers alleged that the various defend-
ants had been dumping sewage and waste materials into the Atlantic
Ocean in violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
("FWPCA") and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries
Act ("MPRSA"). 161 Both the FWPCA and the MPRSA have provi-
sions which expressly grant private parties the right to seek injunctive
relief under these statutes. 162 The plaintiffs in Sea Clammers, however,
of Title IX, its analysis of the legislative history required an analysis of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 instead. Title IX had been patterned after Title VI, with the substitution
of the word "sex" in Title IX for the words "race, color, or national origin" in Title VI; the
drafters of Title IX explicitly assumed that Title IX would be interpreted in the same way
that Title VI had been. 441 U.S. at 694-96.
157 Id. at 716 n.52.
158 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976). See note 17 supra.
159 442 U.S. at 575.
160 453 U.S. 1 (1980).
161 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); 33 U.S.C § 1401 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
162 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979); 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1976 & Supp. III
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also sought damages under the two acts, despite the fact that dam-
ages were not expressly provided for private parties under either stat-
ute. 163 The Third Circuit determined that the FWPCA and
MPRSA implicitly authorized suits for damages in addition to the
express private injunctive remedy, and the defendants appealed. 164
The Supreme Court, in deciding whether an implied damages
remedy existed within the FWPCA and the MPRSA, turned once
again to the legislative history of the statutes. Although the FWPCA
and the MPRSA are broad statutes with unusually elaborate en-
forcement provisions,1 65 their legislative histories indicated that Con-
gress strongly intended to limit private actions to injunctive relief.166
The Court quoted a statement made by Senator Hart as being repre-
sentative of this intent:
It has been argued, however, that conferring additional
rights on the citizen may burden the courts unduly. I would ar-
gue that the citizen suit provision of S. 4358 has been carefully
drafted to prevent this consequence from arising. First of all, it
should be noted that the bill makes no provision for damages to
the individual. It therefore provides no incentives to suit other
than to protect the health and welfare of those suing and others
similarly situated. It will be the rare, rather than the ordinary
person, I suspect, who, with no prospect of financial gain and the
very real prospect of financial loss, will initiate court action under
this bill.167
At no place in the legislative history of RICO is there any simi-
lar indication that Congress intended to deny equitable remedies to
private plaintiffs suing under the statute, much less the type of con-
crete expression of legislative intent provided by Senator Hart's state-
ment. The Supreme Court's analysis of the legislative history of the
FWPCA and the MPRSA is helpful in analyzing the different legis-
lative history of RICO only to the extent that it points out the differ-
1979). It is interesting to note that sections 1365(a) and 1415(g) both authorize any person to
sue "to enjoin." Section 1964(c) of RICO, on the other hand, states that any person injured
may sue "and shall recover threefold the damages .... " 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). The
difference in the wording of these statutory schemes supports the argument that Congress
intends by the use of the word "and" to add to the remedies already available to a plaintiff,
while use of the word "to" shows intent to restrict the remedies available. See notes 19-20
-.pra.
163 453 U.S. at 12.
164 National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1229 (3rd Cir.
1980).
165 453 U.S. at 13-14.
166 Id at 17-18.
167 Id at 18 n.27.
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ences in the histories. The Sea Clammers analysis in fact demonstrates
that courts should imply private equitable relief under RICO. The
Kaushal court's reliance on Sea Clammers to deny equitable relief was,
therefore, unfounded.
3. RICO and the Last Two Factors of the Cori v. Ash Test
In both Touche Ross and Sea Clammers, the Supreme Court found
it unnecessary to decide whether any of the statutes satisfied the third
and fourth factors of the Cort test, because "[t]he central inquiry re-
mains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by
implication, a private cause of action."1 68 In both cases, once the
Court decided that the legislative history could not support a finding
that Congress intended to provide the private remedy, there was no
need for further analysis.' 69 The Supreme Court's discussion of the
legislative history of Title IX in Cannon shows, however, that an anal-
ysis of RICO does not justify ending the inquiry at the second fac-
tor.1 70 Since the Kaushal court, by choosing to rely on Touche Ross
and Sea Clammers, mistakenly neglected to apply the third and fourth
factors of the Cori test to RICO, it is necessary to do so here.
The third factor of the Cort test is whether it is consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a
remedy for the plaintiff.17' As the Supreme Court stated in Cannon,
when a "remedy is necessary or at least helpful to the accomplish-
ment of the statutory purpose, the Court is decidedly receptive to its
implication under the statute." 17 2 Providing such an equitable rem-
edy in a private RICO cause of action would certainly further the
purpose of RICO.
With regard to the fourth factor of the Cort test, it must be deter-
mined whether it would be inappropriate to infer private equitable
remedies based solely on federal law because this relief is tradition-
ally relegated to state law in an area basically the concern of the
states. 173 The Supreme Court has answered this question. The
Court, in Turkette, stated that the purpose of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 was to enable the Federal government to address
a large and neglected problem. Existing law, state and federal, was
168 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575.
169 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 576; Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 17-18.
170 See text accompanying notes 152-59 supra.
171 Cori, 422 U.S. at 78.
172 441 U.S. at 703.
173 422 U.S. at 78.
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inadequate to address the national problem of organized crime.174
RICO was enacted in response to the inadequacy of state law, and
thus it cannot reasonably be argued that the implication of private
equitable remedies in the statute fails to satisfy the fourth factor of
the Cori test. 75
Under a strict application of the Cori rules of statutory construc-
tion, RICO should provide equitable relief to private plaintiffs. The
Supreme Court's test in Cort v. Ash and the Court's interpretation of
the test in subsequent cases mandates this result.
IV. Conclusion
When Congress enacted RICO in 1970, it did so in response to a
situation that it perceived to be seriously harming our nation. RICO
is a well-crafted statute and reflects the careful consideration that
Congress deemed necessary. Both the text of RICO and the legisla-
tive history of the statute indicate that RICO makes available equi-
table relief for private plaintiffs suing under its civil provisions.
Critics argue that this grant of equitable relief is not an appropriate
means of combatting the problems that RICO was enacted to ad-
dress. These critics are, of course, entitled to attempt to change
RICO through the legislative process. They should not be entitled,
however, to make this attempt through the judicial forum, given the
text and legislative history of RICO. If RICO is to be emasculated of
one of its most potentially useful aspects, private equitable relief, it
should only be as a result of careful deliberation within the legislative
process. As other courts face this issue, it is hoped that they will rec-
ognize and protect the right of private plaintiffs to receive equitable
relief under RICO.
Donald R. Lee
174 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 (1981).
175 Id. Congress anticipated and rejected arguments that RICO improperly usurps state
power by providing in the statute that "[n]othing in this title shall supersede any provision of
Federal, State, or other law imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addi-
tion to those provided for in this title." The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982)).
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